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11			
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
13	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – EASTERN DIVISION		
14 15	ROBERT ADAMS, CHAD WELCH, JOSEPH WILLIAMS, and	Case No.: EDCV 08-1499 JTM (CTx)	
16	LAVAIL CHARLES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly		
17	situated, and on behalf of the general public,	NOTICE OF MOTION AND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR	
18	Plaintiffs,	FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS	
19	v.	ACTION SETTLEMENT	
20	NEWELL RUBBERMAID, INC., a	DATE: None	
21	Delaware corporation, SMX CORP, INC., an Illinois corporation, SEATON CORP, INC., an Illinois	TIME: None JUDGE: Hon. J. Thomas Marten	
22	Corporation, and DOES 1 through)	
23	50, inclusive,		
24	Defendants.		
25)	
26			
27		J	
28	NOTICE OF MOTION AND UNOPPOSED MOTION	ON EOD EDIAL ADDROVAL OF CLASS ACTION	
	11	OWENT ON FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION	

SETTLEMENT

TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Plaintiffs Robert Adams, Chad Welch, Joseph Williams, and LaVail Charles will move and hereby do move, without opposition by Defendants, for an Order granting final approval of this class action settlement. This application is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which requires court approval of the settlement of class actions.

This Motion will be based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release Between Plaintiffs and Defendants (the "Stipulation" or "Settlement"), the Declaration of Scott A. Miller ("Miller Decl."), the Declaration Jackie Hitomi of CPT Group, Inc., and such evidence or oral argument as may be presented at the request of the Court, and on the complete records and file herein.

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	Dated: January 13, 2010	Pagnostfully Submitted
1	Dated. January 13, 2010	Respectfully Submitted,
2		GAINES & GAINES, APLC
3	Rv	:/s/
4		Kenneth S. Gaines, Esq.
5		Daniel F. Gaines, Esq.
6		Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class Counsel
7		
8		LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT A. MILLER, APC
9		WIEDER, AT C
10	Ву	: /s/
11		Scott A. Miller, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class
12		Counsel
13		STEVEN L. MILLER, APLC
14		
15	Ву	Steven L. Miller, Esq.
16		Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class
17		Counsel
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SETTLEMENT

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

By this unopposed motion, Plaintiffs Robert Adams, Chad Welch, Joseph Williams, and LaVail Charles ("Plaintiffs") and the members of the six settlement classes (collectively "Class Members", "Class" or "Settlement Class") seek final approval of the class action settlement reached with Defendants SMX, Inc., Seaton Corp., and Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. ("Defendants").

By a separate motion, filed concurrently herewith, Plaintiffs move for an award of attorneys' fees and costs, approval of the claims administrator's fees, and approval of the enhancement awards to the Class Representatives.

Subject to Court approval, Plaintiffs have settled the Released Claims of the Class Members as defined in the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release Between Plaintiffs and Defendants (the "Stipulation") against Defendants for up to \$977,000. *See* Miller Decl., Exhibit ("Ex.")¹ A (Stipulation). This class action settlement ("Settlement") resolves the named Plaintiffs' and Class Members' pending Released Claims² against Defendants.

This motion follows a successful settlement administration following the Court's September 23, 2009 Order granting preliminary approval of the

¹ All "Ex." references herein are to the exhibits attached to the Declaration of Scott A. Miller in Support of the Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement submitted herewith, unless otherwise noted.

² All capitalized terms are defined in the Stipulation and incorporated by reference herein.

Settlement. See Ex. B.

As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all of the criteria for final settlement approval under federal law because it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Ex. A; see Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. GE, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004). The positive response of the Class Members to the Settlement provides strong support that final settlement approval is appropriate. To date, 631 Class Members have submitted approved claim forms seeking to participate in the Settlement.³ Declaration of Jackie Hitomi of CPT Group, Inc. ("CPT"), the claims administrator for this action ("Hitomi Decl.") at ¶ 17. Notably, not a single Class Member has objected to any of the terms of the Settlement and only one Class Member has chosen to opt out. See id. at ¶¶ 11, 15; Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 26, 44, 56.

If the Settlement receives final approval, the State of California's Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") will receive \$18,750 for education and enforcement of labor laws. Ex. A at ¶¶ 44(a)(i), 44(d)(i). The Settlement allocates \$6,250 for the members of the Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 2699 Class and the Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 2699 Class. *Id.* Based on the approved claims submitted by Class Members to date, approximately 212 members of the Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 2699 Class and 17 members of the Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 2699 Class have submitted valid claims and will receive monetary settlement awards calculated on a prorated basis based on each Qualified Claimant's number of pay periods during the applicable class period. *See* Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. A at ¶¶ 44(a)(i), 44(d)(i). All \$6,250 allocated to the Labor Code Section 2699

³ The Parties have agreed to accept all late-filed claims through January 7, 2010.

Classes will be distributed to the Qualified Claimants. Id.

The Settlement allocates up to \$567,775.32 for the Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 212/226 Class. Ex. A at ¶ 44(e)(i). Based on the claims made to date, approximately 612 members of this Class will receive monetary settlement payments averaging \$68.80 each. See Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

The Settlement allocates up to \$69,724.68 for the Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 212 Class. Ex. A at ¶ 44(b)(i). Approximately 25 members of this Class will receive monetary settlement payments averaging \$255.53 each. *See* Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

The Settlement allocates up to \$50,000 for the Seaton/SMX Hourly Employee Class. Ex. A at \P 44(f)(i). Approximately 612 members of this Class will receive monetary settlement payments averaging \$6.96 each. See Hitomi Decl. at \P 18.

The Settlement allocates up to \$7,500 for the Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 226/Hourly Employee Class. Ex. A at ¶ 44(c)(i). Approximately 18 members of this Class will receive monetary settlement payments averaging \$60.14 each. See Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

In addition, as part of the Settlement, each of the Defendants has made arrangements so that their current and future California employees can take advantage of free check cashing services that are now in place for them. Ex. A at ¶ 34. Because the Settlement achieves outstanding results for the Settlement Classes, all of Defendants' current and future employees and the State of California, Plaintiffs respectfully request, on behalf of the

⁴ Some individuals may be members of more than one settlement class.

Classes, that the Court approve the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and enter judgment.

By a separate unopposed motion filed concurrently, Plaintiffs move for an order approving an attorneys' fee award of \$189,000 and approving reimbursement of costs of \$5,000 to Class Counsel as part of the Settlement in this case. Ex. A at ¶ 57. Plaintiffs also request the Court confirm the enhancement award agreed to be paid to Plaintiffs Robert Adams, Chad Welch, Joseph Williams, and LaVail Charles in the amount of \$2,500 each. See Ex. A at ¶ 49(A). Finally, Plaintiffs seek approval of \$53,000 in administration expenses to be paid to CPT Group, Inc., the firm retained to administer the settlement. Ex. A at ¶ 50.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

On September 12, 2008, Plaintiffs brought this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Bernardino, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of former and current employees of each of the Defendants. On October 10, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. In the First through Fifth Causes of Actions, it alleges that Defendants 1) issued their employees paychecks drawn on out-of-state banks with no branches in California where they could be cashed on demand, without a fee (Labor Code § 212); 2) failed to pay all employees all wages owed (Labor Code § 1194); 3) failed to accurately itemize employees' wage statements (Labor Code § 226(a),(e)); 4) failed to pay employees all wages due timely upon termination or resignation (Labor Code §§ 201-203); and 5) failed to reimburse expenses incurred by employees in the performance of their job duties (Labor Code § 2802). Miller Decl. at ¶ 5.

The gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that they and proposed Class Members had to resort to paying check cashing fees to cash their paychecks, which were deducted from their wages when they presented their paychecks to be cashed. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the proposed Class Members sometimes could not receive their wages on demand because a hold was placed on their out-of-state paychecks. Miller Decl. at ¶ 6.

The sixth and seventh causes of action in the First Amended Complaint seek restitution under Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. and penalties under Labor Code §§ 2699, et seq. Miller Decl. at ¶ 7.

On October 24, 2008, Defendant Newell answered the First Amended Complaint, denying all of Plaintiffs' allegations.

On October 27, 2008, Defendants Seaton/SMX removed the Action to this Court, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Defendant Newell joined in the Notice of Removal.

On October 31, 2008, Seaton/SMX filed a motion to dismiss and strike portions of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. The hearing on this motion was continued pending settlement discussions.

It was, and continues to be, each of the Defendants' position that their employment practices with respect to the named Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members were always, and continue to be, in compliance with California law. They deny all liability to Class members. Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9.

The Parties agreed to mediate all claims. Prior to mediation, the Parties exchanged substantial informal discovery. Miller Decl. ¶¶ 10-11. To make the mediation session as productive as possible, Plaintiffs' counsel requested that Defendants produce detailed information regarding the size of

of the putative class, its policies as they relate to the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, and their issuance of paychecks during the relevant time period. *Id.* Defendants agreed and produced significant, relevant information to Plaintiffs' counsel which enabled the Parties to have a meaningful discussion of the merits of the case.

On December 16, 2008, the Parties participated in an 18 hour mediation session with Hon. Alexander Williams III (L.A.S.C., Retired), which resulted in an agreement in principle. An additional four months were required to reach a final settlement. In April, 2009, a formal settlement was reached. All of the terms of the Parties' agreement are set forth in the Stipulation. Miller Decl. at ¶ 11.

A. Preliminary Approval, Notice and the Claims Process

On September 14, 2009, Plaintiffs moved the Court for an order preliminarily approving the Settlement and provisionally certifying the Settlement Classes. By Order dated September 23, 2009, the Court granted the joint motion and provisionally certified the Settlement Classes, finding that the Settlement was in the range of reasonableness and fairness that could ultimately be given final approval. See Ex. B. The Court also approved the distribution of the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and Final Fairness and Approval Hearing ("Notice") to Class Members. Ex. B at ¶¶ 6-8.

On September 1, 2009 and September 30, 2009, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b), Defendants mailed notices to the appropriate State and Federal officials of the proposed class action settlement. Miller Decl. at ¶ 13; see also, Docket Nos. 24 and 25 (Proofs of Notification). Because more than 90 days have passed since the date of the notice and no

objections have been received from any officials, a final order and judgment may now be entered. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715(d).

Pursuant to the Court's preliminary order, on October 23, 2009, CPT mailed the Notice to 10,432 Class Members. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 5. As of January 7, 2010, there were 621 approved claims. *Id.* at ¶ 18. Notably, no Class Member objected to the Settlement, and only one Class Member chose to opt out. *Id.* at ¶¶ 11, 15; see also, Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 17, 26, 44, 56.

B. Summary of the Settlement Terms

1. Benefits to the Settlement Class Members

The Stipulation provides for six settlement classes:

a. The Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 212/226 Class is composed of all California current and former employees of Seaton and/or SMX who received wages in the form of checks issued by an out of state bank with no in state address for presentation in the State of California between September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009. Up to \$567,775.32 has been allocated to settle the claims of this class, to be distributed to those Class Members who submit timely claim forms verifying, among other things, that they were employed by Seaton Corp. or SMX, Inc. at some point during the period September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009, that they received one or more live paychecks from Seaton Corp. or SMX, Inc. drawn on a LaSalle Bank account with an address in Illinois, and that either 1) they paid a fee to cash one or more such paychecks and/or had a hold placed on one or more such paychecks, or 2) they suffered an out-of-

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pocket loss, verified by receipts or other similar documentation, as a result of Defendants' failure to provide itemized wage statements. Stip. at ¶ 44(e). Members of this Settlement Class shall receive \$567,775.32 divided by the total number of paychecks issued by Seaton Corp. and SMX, Inc. between September 12, 2004 and the September 23, 2009 for each paycheck issued to a Class Member, up to a maximum of 12 paychecks. *Id.* As of January 7, 2010, 612 Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 212/226 Class Members had made approved claims averaging \$68.80 each. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

The Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 212 Class b. is composed of all California current and former employees of Newell Rubbermaid who received wages in the form of checks issued by an out of state bank with no in state address for presentation in the State of California between September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009. Up to \$69,724.68 has been allocated to settle the claims of this class, to be distributed to those Class Members who submit timely claim forms verifying, among other things, that they were employed by Newell Rubbermaid at some point during the period September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009, that they received paychecks drawn on a Bank of America Account in Atlanta, Georgia, from Defendant Newell Rubbermaid, and that they incurred a fee to cash such a paycheck on one or more occasions or incurred a hold placed on one or more paychecks. Stip. at ¶ 44(b). Members of this Settlement Class shall receive \$69,724.68 divided by the total number of paychecks issued by Newell Rubbermaid to its California employees between September 12, 2004 and September

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September 23, 2009, for each paycheck issued to a Class Member, up to a maximum of 12 paychecks. *Id.* As of January 7, 2010, 25 Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 212 Class_Members had made approved claims averaging \$255.53 each. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

- The Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 2699 Class is composed of all California current and former employees of Seaton and/or SMX who received wages in the form of checks issued by an out of state bank with no in state address for presentation in the State of California between September 12, 2007 and September 23, 2009. \$22,222.23 has been allocated to settle the claims of this class. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(i), 75% of that amount (\$16,666.67) will be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") for enforcement of labor laws and education of employers. All of the remaining 25% (\$5,555.56) will be distributed to Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 2699 Settlement Class members in proportion to their weeks worked during the relevant time period. Stip. at ¶ 44(d). The entire \$5,555.56 will be paid out to members of this class who file timely and valid claims. Id. As of January 7, 2010, 212 Seaton/SMX Labor Code Section 2699 Class Members had made approved claims averaging \$27.29 each. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.
- d. The Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 2699
 Class is composed of all California current and former employees of
 Newell Rubbermaid who received wages in the form of checks
 issued by an out of state bank with no in state address for
 presentation in the State of California between September 12, 2007

and September 23, 2009. \$2,777.77 has been allocated to settle the claims of this class. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(i), 75% of that amount (\$2,083.33) will be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") for enforcement of labor laws and education of employers. All of the remaining 25% (\$694.44) will be distributed to Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 2699 Settlement Class members in proportion to their weeks worked during the relevant time period. The entire \$694.44 will be paid out to members of this class who file timely and valid claims. Stip. at ¶ 44(a). As of January 7, 2010, 17 Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 2699 Class Members had made approved claims averaging \$40.85. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

e. The Seaton/SMX Hourly Employee Class is composed of all persons who are employed or have been employed as hourly employees by Seaton and/or SMX in the State of California between September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009. Up to \$50,000 has been allocated to settle the claims of this class, to be distributed to those Class Members who submit timely claim forms verifying, among other things, that they were employed by Seaton Corp. or SMX, Inc. at some point during the period September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009, the number of weeks they worked, and that they worked hours for which they were not paid in full and/or in a timely manner. Stip. at ¶ 44(f). Members of this Settlement Class shall receive \$50,000 divided by the total number of weeks worked by Seaton Corp. and SMX, Inc. California employees between September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009, times the number of

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weeks they worked for Seaton Corp. or SMX, Inc. during that period. Id. As of January 7, 2010, 612 Seaton/SMX Hourly Employee Class Members had made approved claims averaging \$6.96. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

f. The Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 226/Hourly Employee Class is composed of all persons who are employed or have been employed as hourly employees by Newell Rubbermaid in the State of California between September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009. Up to \$7,500 has been allocated to settle the claims of this class, to be distributed to those Class Members who submit timely claim forms verifying, among other things, that they were employed by Newell Rubbermaid at some point during the period September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009, the number of weeks they worked, and that they worked hours for which they were not paid in full and/or in a timely manner. Stip. at ¶ 44(c). Each claimant shall be entitled to an amount equal to \$7,500 divided by the total number of weeks worked by all Newell Rubbermaid California employees between September 12, 2004 and September 23, 2009, times the number of weeks they worked for Newell Rubbermaid during that period. Id. As of January 7, 2010, 18 Newell Rubbermaid Labor Code Section 226/Hourly Employee Class Members had made approved claims averaging \$60.14 each. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 18.

Members of one class may be members of one or more other classes. The members of the settlement classes are referred to collectively as the "Class Members," and the six classes are referred to collectively as the

"Class." For settlement purposes only, the Parties have stipulated that the six settlement classes satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for class certification. Stip. at ¶¶ 16, 25-29.

2. Other Settlement Terms

Without admitting liability, each of the Defendants has made arrangements so that their current and future California employees can take advantage of free check cashing services that are now in place for them. Ex. A at ¶ 34.

The Parties agreed to the designation of Gaines & Gaines, APLC, Steven L. Miller, APLC, and the Law Offices of Scott A. Miller, APC as counsel for the Settlement Classes for all purposes in the case ("Class Counsel"). Ex. A at ¶ 4.

The Parties also agreed that Class Counsel will seek, and Defendant and Defendant's Counsel will not dispute, the Court's approval of an attorneys' fee award in an amount not to exceed \$189,000 (equivalent to 19.3% of the total settlement value) to compensate Class Counsel for all work performed and to be performed through final dismissal of the case and complete implementation of the Settlement. Ex. A at ¶ 57. The Parties also agreed that Class Counsel will be paid an amount not to exceed \$5,000 to cover out-of-pocket costs incurred, subject to verification of costs by the Court. *Id.* The Parties have agreed that up to \$152,530 for Class Counsel's awarded attorneys' fees and costs shall be deducted from the Seaton/SMX Maximum Settlement Amount and up to \$41,470 shall be deducted from the Newell Rubbermaid Maximum Settlement Amount. *Id.*

The Stipulation also provides that, subject to the Court's approval, Plaintiffs Robert Adams, Chad Welch, Joseph Williams, and LaVail

Charles will each receive an enhancement of up to \$2,500 for serving as Class Representatives. Ex. A at \P 49(A).

The Parties selected CPT as the neutral claims administrator to perform all acts related to all payments to Plaintiffs, Class Members, the LWDA, and Class Counsel. Ex. A at ¶ 55. CPT handled all communications to and from Class Members, including determining (within the parameters of the Settlement) a Class Member's eligibility to participate in this Settlement. *Id.* The Stipulation allocated up to \$53,000 for claims administration fees, based on the sending of notices to over 10,400 employees. *Id.* at ¶ 50,55

III. ARGUMENT

The policy of the federal courts is to encourage settlement before trial. See Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 575 (noting "strong judicial policy" favoring settlements, provided they were reached through arms-length, non-collusive negotiations); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (endorsing the trial court's "proper deference to the private consensual decision of the parties" when approving a settlement); Franklin v. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). "Litigation settlements offer parties and their counsel relief from the burdens and uncertainties inherent in trial...[t]he economics of litigation are such that pretrial settlement may be more advantageous for both sides than expending the time and resources inevitably consumed in the trial process." Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1225.

A. The Notice Provided was the Best Practicable Under the Circumstances

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) requires that the class

members receive "the best notice practicable under the circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P 23(c)(2); see also, Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 575. "Notice is satisfactory if it 'generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard." Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 575; Torrisi v. Tuscon Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1993) (notice must present a fair recital of the subject matter and give class members an opportunity to be heard).

On September 23, 2009 the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement and authorized the distribution of the proposed Notice. See Ex. B (September 23, 2009 Order); see also, Ex. A (Stipulation, Exhibit 1 The court-approved Notice advised Class Members of the (Notice)). essential terms of the Settlement, defined the Settlement Classes, set forth the procedure for opting out of the Classes or filing objections to the Settlement and provided specifics on the date, time and place of the final fairness hearing. See Ex. A (Stipulation, Exhibit 1). The Notice also provided the details of the case and the proposed settlement and the specific options available to Class Members. In particular, it informed each Class Member of the settlement formulas, thereby enabling Class Members to make an informed decision about whether to opt out, submit a claim form or take other or no action. In short, the Notice provided all essential information that enabled Class Members to exercise their rights and make informed decisions regarding the proposed settlement.

On October 23, 2009, CPT, the claims administrator, sent the Notice and Claim Form packets via first class mail to the last known address of each Class Member. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 7. Federal courts have made clear

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that individual mailings to each Class Member's last known address is a sufficient form of notice, particularly where efforts are made to locate new addresses for any undelivered notice packets. See e.g., Aguilar v. Melkonian Enters., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80690, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2006) (granting preliminary approval of parties' plan to mail notice to class members' last known address as identified through Defendants' records and to re-mail any returned mail, if necessary); see also, White v. Nat'l Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618-620 (1997). CPT made reasonable efforts to locate any Class Members whose notice packets were returned. Hitomi Decl. at ¶¶ 6-9.

The notice procedure also provided adequate time for Class Members to submit claim forms, make objections, or opt out of the Settlement Class. Ex. A at ¶¶ 54-56. For Class Members who submitted a deficient claim form, the Claims Administrator provided notice of the deficiency and adequate opportunity to cure the defect, if subject to cure. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 6, 8, 9. The Parties have agreed to accept all late-filed claims through January 7, 2010.

The Notice approved by the Court at the preliminary approval stage was the best notice practicable under the circumstances and fairly apprised Class Members of the proposed settlement terms and their options.

B. Final Settlement Approval is Warranted

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the court must approve any proposed class action settlement. Court approval of class action settlements requires the following steps:

- (2) Dissemination of mailed and/or published notice of the settlement to all affected Class members; and
- (3) A "formal fairness hearing," or final settlement approval hearing, at which Class Members may be heard regarding the settlement, and at which evidence and argument concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement may be presented.

Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth (4th ed. 2004) ("Manual") § 21.632-34.

The first two steps of this process are now complete. The first step was completed on September 14, 2009 and September 23, 2009, when this Court conducted a hearing and then granted preliminary approval to the Settlement. Ex. B. In doing so, the Court determined that the Settlement was within the range of possible final approval and that notice to the Class Members of the Settlement's terms and of the scheduling of the formal fairness hearing should be distributed. Ex. B at ¶ 2, 6.

The second step in the class action settlement approval process, dissemination of the Notice, is complete as well. In accordance with the Court's preliminary approval order, the Parties worked with CPT to implement the Court-approved notice program, which employed the best practicable means to disseminate to all Class Members notice of the Settlement terms as well as the date and time of the final approval hearing. Pursuant to the Court's order, CPT sent the Notice to Class Members on October 23, 2009.

The last step in the class action settlement approval process is the

final approval hearing, at which the Court shall finally conclude whether the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). At the final approval hearing, scheduled on January 11, 2009, Class Members will have the opportunity to be heard regarding the Settlement, and Class Counsel will present evidence and argument in support of the Settlement. At the conclusion of the final approval hearing, the Court will decide whether to grant final approval of the Settlement and whether to enter a final order and judgment.

1. Each of the Relevant Criteria Supports Final Approval

When evaluating the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a settlement, courts consider some or all of the following factors: the strength of the plaintiff's case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the amount offered in the settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. *Churchill Village*, 361 F.3d at 576; *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026. In addition, the Court must determine that the settlement was not the product of collusion between the negotiating parties. *Churchill Village*, 361 F.3d at 576; *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026.

a. The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case Turns on an Untested Area of Law Creating Significant Risks to Plaintiffs and the Classes

A critical factor in determining the strength of Plaintiffs' case is the fact that there is very little authority on the application of Labor Code § 212 in the present context. Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 19, 39 (to Counsel's

knowledge, there are only two published decisions in other cases on Labor Code § 212 in this context; Class Counsel Steven L. Miller and Scott A. Miller represented plaintiffs in both cases). Plaintiffs maintain that they would succeed at trial. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that they would succeed in defeating Plaintiffs' claims, either through summary judgment or before the trier of fact. However, given the overall lack of authority on the disputed issues here, there is uncertainty as to how the question of Defendants' liability under Labor Code § 212 would be resolved at trial.

Such uncertainty regarding the interpretation of Labor Code § 212 strongly supports that the Settlement is a good compromise for absent Class Members. The Class Members submitting valid claims will receive monetary benefits and avoid the risks of proceeding with a trial on an untested theory of liability. See Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 21, 22, 39.

The Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration b. of Continued Litigation Weighs in Favor of Final Approval

Employment class action cases are expensive and time-consuming to prosecute. However, this case presents a more difficult situation than most, given the lack of legal authority surrounding the interpretation of Labor Code § 212. Continued litigation of this action against Defendants would likely be complex and expensive, due to the size of the class and the nature of the claims. Miller Decl. at \P 4, 19, 39.

Furthermore, the Settlement avoids the need for a contested class certification motion that would be time consuming and costly for Plaintiffs to file, Defendants to oppose, and the Court to decide. In addition, if the

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Court were to deny such a motion for class certification, Class Members would be left without a group remedy, and the issues presented here would need to be litigated individually in a piecemeal, costly, and time-consuming fashion. The Settlement also avoids a lengthy trial or trials that likely would have involved testimony by numerous witnesses and experts. *See* Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 21, 27, 38, 39.

Extensive, complex litigation will also result in substantial financial risk to Class Members. SMX, Inc. and Seaton Corp. are staffing companies who employ or employed the vast majority of Class Members. The economic climate in the employee staffing industry is particularly challenging during the present economic recession. The risk that extended litigation and/or a substantial judgment against these Defendants would render them insolvent was a factor strongly considered prior to entering into the Settlement. Miller Decl. at ¶ 20.

c. The Value of the Settlement Favors Final Approval

Under the Settlement, Defendants have agreed to pay up to a total of \$977,000 (including attorneys' fees, costs, Plaintiffs' enhancements, and costs of claims administration). Ex. A. at ¶ 37. Without admitting liability for any violation of law, each of the Defendants has made arrangements so that their current and future California employees can take advantage of free check cashing services that are now in place for them. Ex. A at ¶ 34.

The Settlement provides for substantial benefits in terms of a cash settlement payable in one payment and paid not long after the commencement of the litigation. Miller Decl. at ¶ 24.

Upon commencing this Action, Plaintiffs promptly conducted formal

and informal discovery regarding all Labor Code violations alleged. Defendants provided sufficient information to quickly establish that many of the claims alleged in the First Amended Complaint – specifically, those for wages for time worked off-the-clock and expense reimbursement – had little, if any, merit (and value). Plaintiffs established that their claims under Labor Code § 212 were likely their strongest claims. As such, most of the Maximum Settlement Amount is allocated to resolve these claims. Miller Decl. at ¶ 27.

The amounts for which Class Members are eligible are not only inline with other similar settlements, but also commensurate with the value of the claim adjusted for risk. Class Counsel believes the maximum value of this case, were Plaintiffs to prevail at trial on a classwide basis, is approximately \$1,994,400 (the vast majority of which accounts for discretionary penalties). The maximum settlement value here represents a In reaching this settlement, Class Counsel cautiously 49% recovery. factored 1) the risk of Defendants defeating class certification (which would effectively preclude any recovery for most class members, whose claims are too small to warrant individual suits), 2) the risk of Defendants prevailing on the merits at trial, in a novel area of law with little case law to guide the Court, 3) that the Court has discretion to reduce the penalties awarded pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2698 et. seq., 4) that the Class' actual damages represent only a small portion of the recovery sought, with discretionary penalties representing the remainder, and 5) that Plaintiffs' costs will increase exponentially as the matter moves forward; in the event Plaintiffs prevail at trial, the amount payable to the Class would effectively be reduced as a result.

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Counsel strongly believes the settlement represents a fair compromise of the Class' claims. Miller Decl. at ¶ 28.

In short, the benefits obtained by the Class are substantial in relation to the claimed harm suffered by the Class. Accordingly, the value of the settlement – in both monetary and non-monetary terms – justifies the final approval of the Settlement.

d. Disclosure of Documents and Data Demonstrating the Strengths and Weaknesses of this Action was Completed Prior to Entering into the Settlement

The extent of discovery that has been completed and the stage of the litigation are factors that courts consider in determining the fairness of a settlement. See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); see also Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009). The Settlement was reached only after the Parties exchanged substantive information through informal discovery, as well as apprised each other of their respective factual contentions, legal theories, and defenses. Thus, the Parties negotiated the proposed Settlement with ample knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of this case and the amounts necessary to compensate Settlement Class Members for their estimated damages.

The Parties engaged in extensive good-faith, arms-length negotiations, including an 18 hour mediation session conducted before an experienced mediator and subsequent extended settlement discussions. Miller Decl. at ¶ 11. Given the nature of claims, tentative recovery for the Classes, and other settlement terms, the fact that this settlement was negotiated at arms-length is inescapable.

The Maximum Settlement Amount falls within a realistic range of Prior to commencing settlement discussions, and outcomes at trial. continuing thereafter until a settlement was finally reached, Class Counsel engaged in an exhaustive review of facts, evidence, and statistics necessary to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the Class' claims, the strengths and weaknesses of Defendant's potential defenses, and a range of potential outcomes at trial. See Clark, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 801. Class Counsel concluded that the largest recovery which the Class could anticipate at trial, if certification was granted and if the class prevailed on all meritorious theories in the Complaint, was approximately \$1,994,400. This would represent restitution and substantial discretionary penalties resulting from Defendants' alleged violation of Labor Code § 212. Miller Decl. at ¶ 27. The maximum settlement amount of \$977,000 represents a recovery of 49% As such, Class Counsel strongly believes that this of the maximum. represents a fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise of the Class' claims. Miller Decl. at ¶ 27-28.

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e. The Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Final Approval

Class Counsel support the Settlement as fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the best interests of the Settlement Classes as a whole. Class Counsel believe this Settlement to be an excellent result for Settlement Class Members. See Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 21-28, 44.

The endorsement of qualified and well-informed counsel of the settlement as fair is entitled to significant weight. Class Counsel have significant experience in class action litigation, particularly in the employment context. See Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 2-4, 19, 37. As previously

mentioned, Class Counsel was among the first in the State of California to represent plaintiffs with claims under Labor Code § 212 and address the sufficiency of those claims before a court. Class Counsel are of the opinion that the Settlement is fair and in the best interest of the Class Members. Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 19, 37.

f. Class Members' Positive Reaction to the Settlement Favors Final Approval

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, courts examine the reaction of class members to determine if a settlement that directly affects their interests should be approved as fair, adequate, and reasonable. As of January 7, 2010, 631 Class Members had filed a valid claim. *See* Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 17.

Class Counsel have collectively litigated over a dozen cases similar to this one, with claims pursuant to Labor Code § 212 and related penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 2699; the claims rates in this case are consistent with those in other cases and have all been finally approved by California State and Federal Courts. Miller Decl. at ¶ 19-20.

Of most importance is the fact that no Class Member has objected to the Settlement here. Hitomi Decl. at ¶ 15. Moreover, only 1 Class Member has chosen to opt out of the Settlement. *Id.* at ¶ 11. In this action, the Court should construe the overwhelming non-opposition to and participation in the Settlement as strong indications of Class Members' support for the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable.

For all of the reasons stated above, the Settlement proposed in this action is fair, reasonable and adequate.

C. The Settlement Classes Meet the Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements

In the preliminary approval order, the Court conditionally held that, for settlement purposes, the Settlement Classes satisfy the class certification criteria of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23. Ex. B at ¶ 3. For the reasons discussed herein, the certification of the Settlement Classes for settlement purposes should be confirmed in a final approval order.

1. The Settlement Classes Are Sufficiently Numerous

The numerosity requirement is satisfied when joinder of all class members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). According to Defendant's records, there are over 150 members in each of the Settlement Classes. Miller Decl. at ¶ 32. Each of the six Settlement Classes is sufficiently numerous such that joinder is impracticable.

2. The Settlement Classes Share Common Questions of Law and Fact

To qualify for certification, proposed class members must share common questions of fact and law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Here, significant questions common to the members of each Settlement Class include whether Defendants issued paychecks to them during the Class Period that did not meet the criteria set forth in Labor Code § 212, and whether Class Members paid check cashing fees as a result. Further common questions turn on Defendants' employment practices as applied to all Class Members, including whether wage statements issued by Defendants to Class Members comply with California law, whether Defendants' pay all employees for all hours worked, and whether

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Defendants timely paid their employees upon termination and/or resignation. Thus, commonality exists among the Settlement Class members.

3. The Class Representatives' Claims are Typical of the Proposed Class Members'

Typicality is satisfied if the Class Representatives' claims share a common element with the class claims because they arise from a common practice or course of conduct. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1232 (9th Cir. 2007) (typicality satisfied where injuries Class Members suffered were caused by defendant's alleged common practice across many Wal-Mart stores); see also, Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 ("representative claims are 'typical' if they are reasonably coextensive with those of absent Class Members; they need not be substantially identical"). Plaintiffs Robert Adams, Chad Welch, Joseph Williams, and LaVail Charles, the proposed Class Representatives, each has claims typical of the other Class Members' claims. Plaintiffs allege that they, like the other Class Members, were employed by one or more of the Defendants and were subject to the Labor Code violations alleged in the Action, including the receipt of live paychecks that were drawn on an out-of-state bank without any California branches. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result, they were forced to incur check cashing fees to obtain their wages. Defendants allegedly did not make arrangements to provide Plaintiffs and other Class Members with a means to cash their paychecks in California without charge. Also, because the paychecks were drawn on an out-of-state bank, Plaintiffs allege that they and other Class Members could not receive their wages on demand when they presented their paychecks for cashing. Plaintiffs' and the Class

Members' claims are based on alleged injuries due to Defendant's alleged common practice of failing to comply with the provisions of the California Labor Code. Thus, the typicality requirement is satisfied in this case. Miller Decl. at ¶ 35.

4. The Class Representatives and Their Chosen Counsel are Adequate

In the preliminary approval order, the Court approved Plaintiffs Robert Adams, Chad Welch, Joseph Williams, and LaVail Charles as the class representatives. Ex. B at ¶ 4. Each of the Plaintiffs has demonstrated that they will vigorously represent the interests of the Class Members. Miller Decl. at ¶ 36. Furthermore, Plaintiffs retained competent counsel, experienced in employment class actions, to represent the Classes. Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 2-4, 37; see also, Ex. B at ¶ 4 (approving Plaintiffs' chosen counsel as Class Counsel).

5. The Settlement Classes also Satisfy the Rule 23(b) Requirements for Class Certification

The Settlement Classes also meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) requires common questions of law or fact to predominate over questions affecting individual Class Members, and the class action to be superior to other methods for efficient adjudication of the claims. Here, the claims involve Defendant's common employment practices, including their issuance of paychecks which allegedly do not comply with the requirements of California law. These alleged violations apply to all Class Members in the same manner. Common questions of law and fact, specifically whether Defendants issued paychecks to Class Members that met the requirements of Labor Code §

212 and whether Class Members could cash the paychecks only by paying a check cashing fee, predominate over any individual questions.

Furthermore, a class action is the superior method for settling this controversy because the claims of the individual Class Members are relatively small, making it uneconomical and essentially unfeasible for them separately to litigate their claims. *See Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1023 (finding class action superior where costs of individual claims would dwarf individual recovery).

D. Court Approval of the PAGA Penalty Portion of the Settlement

Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1), the court must review and approve the settlement of penalties sought under that Labor Code section. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(1). For all of the reasons stated above, the Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be approved. As part of the Settlement, Defendants have agreed to pay a combined total of \$25,000 to settle the claims of the two Labor Code Section 2699 Classes, of which the substantial payment of \$18,750 will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency. This portion of the Settlement should be approved.

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs requests that the Court grant final approval of this Settlement and approve distribution of the settlement funds to the State of California and all Settlement Class Members, as set forth in the Stipulation.

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2	Dated: January 13, 2010 R	Respectfully Submitted,
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28		ON FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION